Abstract
I. Introduction
The recent currency crises in Thailand, Mexico, and in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) have revitalized an interest in studying the balance of payment crisis and the speculative attack on the pegged exchange rate regime. General agreement is that fundamental disequilibrium results from inconsistent policies, which are not compatible with the pegged rate regime. W ith depleting (or accumulating) foreign reserves, the monetary authority confronts a dilemma of either abandoning the pegged rate regime, or retain ing it by changing other policies. When the public perceives that the stock of the foreign reserves has reached the tolerable bound set by the monetary authority, the speculative attack will precipitate a collapse. Furthermore, if the monetary authority envisages that the cost of retaining the pegged rate regime outweighs the benefit of defending it, the rational public, knowing the intention of the monetary authority, will induce a self-fulfilling attack.1 Unlike other crises, the crises of the ERM in the fall of 1992 is a distin guished one. To join the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), each mem ber state has to possess a healthy economic structure in order to meet the convergence criteria (on inflation, budget deficits, exchange rate, and inter est rates) postulated in the Maastricht Treaty. One of the requirements is that the exchange rate of each member state needs to observe normal fluc tuation margins provided by the ERM .2 W ith commitment to a self-disci 1. The speculative attack and collapse of the fixed rate regime was pioneered by Krugman [1979] . There are two arguments when discussing this issue. One is based on the fundamental disequilibrium, and the surveyed articles could be found in Agenor, Bhandari, and Flood [1992] , and Blackburn and Sola [1993] . The other stresses that the speculative attack is not necessarily triggered by fundamental disequilibrium and a self-fulfilling speculative attack can be expected and completed arbitrarily by the herding behavior of the public. Examples could be found in Obstfeld [1986 Obstfeld [ , 1994 Obstfeld [ , 1996 , Sachs, et al [1996] . Flood and Marion [1996] suggest that the self-fulfilling speculative attack is provoked by the fundamental disequilibrium as the stylized facts indicated, instead of the expected policy change designed by most self-fulfilling models. 2. At the beginning of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979， the member states agreed to maintain their bilateral exchange rates within plus and minus 2.25 percent of a central rate, with an exception of Italy which is using a wider band of plus and minus 6 percent.
plined policy, joining the ERM does help narrow the inflation and interest rate differentials among the member states.3 However, the long-lasting incompatible policies of the member state could undermine its central rate.
Consequently, a realignment is needed for the member states, otherwise the viability of the ERM might be threatened. During the ERM 's 1992 crisis, Britain and Italy withdrew from the ERM, Spain devalued its central parity, and the Irish punt and the Portuguese escudo both weathered the crisis after im posing capital control. The currencies of B elgium , Denm ark, France, and Holland, though, all survived the crisis, all four faced the greater pressure of speculative attack.4 Existing models of exchange rate collapse are based on the paper by Krugman [1979] , in which he assumed a lower bound on reserves and a monetary policy under which reserves were systematically declining. He showed that the timing of exchange rate collapse was predictable and coin cident with a speculative attack on reserves in which reserves are driven to their lower bound. This model has been extended and empirically imple mented. The empirical implementations show a rising probability of collapse as the actual collapse date nears.5
Given that upper and lower bounds on reserves, and implicitly the deci sion to abandon the fixed exchange rate, are policy decisions for each indi vidual member state, we suggest a pre-condition for an exchange rate crisis.6 Economic theory implies such a pre-condition when the collapse is 3. During the crisis, Spain and Italy still reveal significant inflation differentials relative to other member states, which have been interpreted as loss of competitiveness. In most member states, the interest rate differentials do converge since the EMS was founded. However, the ERM encourages "convergence play， '， which enables specula tors to borrow funds from the countries with relatively low interest rate such as Ger many, and invest in high-yield countries such as Italy and Spain since the risk of exchange rate depreciation is overestimated. 4. Eichengreen and Wyplosz [1993] review the ERM crisis of Fall 1992， and ascribe the crisis to self-fulfilling forces, though two commentators, William Branson and Rudi ger Dornbusch, hold a different view of the crisis as a fundamental-triggering. Drazen and Masson [1994] , Ozkan and Sutherland [1994] claim that the policy change expected by the public caused the ERM crisis. 5. The empirical studies include Blanco and Garber [1986] , Cumby and Wijnbergen [1989] , and Goldberg [1994] . 6. This condition is applicable to the target zone regime, like the one operated under triggered by fundamentals. Consider the official settlements account of the balance of payments. A "no-Ponzi game" condition on reserve debt together with an optimality condition, limiting the desirability of indefinitely accumu lating reserves, implies expected intertemporal balance on the official set tlements account. That is, when current policies lead to a failure of expected intertemporal balance, some policies are eventually changed. One policy subject to change is the current level of the exchange rate. Therefore, our hypothesis is that exchange rate collapse can be the result of a failure of intertemporal balance, given current behavior and policy.7
The pre-condition for exchange rate collapse can also be used to predict speculative activity on the foreign exchange market. When agents obtain evidence of a violation of expected intertemporal balance, they could rea sonably anticipate an exchange rate collapse and attack. Therefore, we expect that exchange rate collapse is preceded by evidence of a violation of intertemporal balance, which creates a speculative attack on reserves. It is im portant to note that, at the point of attack, a violation of expected intertemporal balance is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for an exchange rate change. It is not necessary because exchange rate change could be the consequence of a multi-part policy change from an initial point of expected intertemporal balance. In this case, the exchange rate change is unlikely to be accompanied by speculative attack, as agents are not likely to acquire advance information of the policy change. A violation of expected intertem poral balance is not sufficient for the exchange rate change because governments could decide to change other policies to achieve expected intertemporal balance. Therefore, the frequency with which a fail ure of intertemporal balance triggers exchange rate collapse and the fre quency with which exchange rate collapse is preceded by a failure of intertemporal balance are both empirical questions.
Trehan and Walsh [1991] proposed a method to determine whether cur rent behavior follows intertemporal balance for a government. They show the ERM. As indicated in Krugman and Rotemberg [1991] , the monetary authority could not escape the necessity of holding reserves to defend its parity within the margins. 7. Daniel [1994] makes a formal argument. that a sufficient condition for intertemporal budget balance is that the first difference of debt is stationary. However, stationarity of the first difference of debt is not a necessary condition for the intertemporal budget balance.
We propose that a necessary condition for the violation of intertemporal bal ance is that the growth rate of government debt is non-stationary. There fore, in the context of the official settlements account, non-stationary behav ior of the growth rate of reserves could generate expectations that policy will change, triggering speculative attack and collapse.
In this paper we present a time series of Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) statistics, constructed with a fixed sample size, which rolls through each series. This allows us to determine the timing of evidence of non-stationary behavior, and implicitly of expectations of policy change. The sample con sists of monthly data for seven countries in the ERM in which their parity either ends or is seriously threatened during the crisis in the Fall of 1992.
There are crises in which a country's reserves were falling, as well as crises in which a country's reserves were rising.
To investigate the sustainability of the ERM, it is important to know that the crisis of the individual state is not sufficient for the ERM to collapse. W ith concerted intervention by the central banks from the member states, it will be able to avoid the collapse triggered by an individual state. 8 Fisher [1996] proposes that the cointegration of the foreign exchange reserves within the member states under a system of fixed rates implies an efficient allocation. The cointegration relation implies that there exists efficient intergenerational exchange among the member states. Economically speaking, the consideration of efficiency justifies, at least, the purposes of the ERM.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II，summa rizes Trehan and Walsh's argument that the intertemporal budget balance requires stationarity of the first difference of debt, then proposes a neces sary condition for the violation of the intertemporal balance, and we close section II by presenting a description of the rolling Dickey-Fuller statistics and the Johansen's test which we use to identify whether there is an effi 296 Intertemporal Balance, Sustainability, and Efficiency of the Exchange Rate Mechanism 8. Using the "very short-term financing facility (VSTFF)" allows the attacked currency to borrow from other member states for intra-marginal interventions whenever its currency reaches the edge of its fluctuation band.
cient allocation in the ERM. Section III presents the empirical results, and Section IV contains conclusions.
II. Motivation for Empirical Tests
A. Intertemporal Budget Balance and Stationarity Trehan and Walsh [1991] use the time series behavior of the stock of U.S. government debt to determine whether the U.S. government budget con straint is expected to be intertemporally balanced. The equation for the change in debt is given by:
where st is the real stock of outstanding debt (assets if negative) at the end of period t, rt is the real rate of interest during the period, and dt is the funda mental deficit, that is, revenues minus expenditures exclusive of interest on the debt. The equation for expected intertemporal budget balance can be derived by solving equation (1) forward for st_h and taking expectations conditional on information available at t -1. This yields:
where pt+ =11 (l+ rt + i) is the ; -period discount factor from time t to t+j.
i = 0
The expectation of intertemporal budget balance requires that the last term be zero, yielding the transversality condition:
To satisfy the transversality condition, the expected discounted value of the real stock of debt must go toward zero as time goes to infinity. Using equa tion (2) ， this requires that the current stock of debt equals the present value of current and expected future net-of-interest surpluses. Intuitively the stock of debt can grow no faster than the rate of interest.
Trehan and Walsh [1991] show that if is a stochastic process, strictly bounded below by 1 + 5 where 5 〉0， and st-st_x is a stationary process, then expected intertemporal budget balance is satisfied. However, as indi cated in Trehan and Walsh, the stationarity of is only a sufficient condition, not a necessary condition for the intertemporal balance to be held. W hat we are interested in is to find a sufficient condition for the viola tion of the intertemporal balance. Intuitively, equation (3) indicates that if st grows faster than p t ，then intertemporal balance will not be held since the limit of the product of the two will not approach zero. Huang and Lin [1993] , and Campbell and Mankiw [1989] loglinearize the intertemporal balance equation. Under the assumption of no-Ponzi game, therefore, equation (2) could be rewritten as
where In represents taking natural log, and 又 are the parameters from loglinearization. The non-stationarity of InSf-lnSf^ will not cause equation (3) to converge to zero, which violates our assumption of no-Ponzi game and therefore, the intertemporal balance.
Equation (2) can be used to discuss intertemporal balance on the official settlements account of the balance of payments. Interpret st as negative offi cial reserves and dt as the net-of-official-interest balance on the official set tlements account. Equation (1) says that the change of reserves equals the interest paid (received) by the domestic monetary authority on its reserve debt (assets) plus a net-of-official-interest deficit (surplus) on the balance of the official settlements account. Intertemporal balance on the official settle ments account requires that equation (3) hold with equality for reserves.
Empirically, if speculators have evidence that the stationarity condition is violated, they have reason to expect policy change, including the possible abandonment of the fixed exchange rate. Therefore, we test whether specu lative attack and exchange rate collapse are preceded by evidence of nonstationarity. We hypothesize that non-stationarity of the growth rate of reserves is a signal of future exchange rate change. This signal applies equally to deficit and surplus countries.
There is a significant difference between the behavior of government debt and the behavior of foreign exchange reserves under fixed exchange rates.
The behavior of government debt is a direct reflection of policy while the behavior of reserves reflects a mixture of policy and speculative activity.
However, if speculative activity is a function of policy, then any non-stationari ty reflects expected intertemporal imbalance, given current policy, since the current policy is the cause of the speculative activity. Alternatively, if non-stationary behavior can be created by arbitrary speculative activity, then the exchange rate crises could be self-fulfilling, and not induced by current poli cy. The evidence of a failure of intertemporal balance can be created by arbi trary speculative activity, leading to a self-fulfilling exchange rate crisis.
Therefore, it is necessary to realize that a violation of expected intertemporal balance could be created by arbitrary speculative behavior instead of policy.9
It is important to know that during a crises within the ERM there exist reserve-accumulating and reserve-depleting members. As suggested by Fisher [1996] , if there is efficient allocation in a system of fixed rates, there exists a cointegrated vector of the foreign exchange reserves among the member states. This cointegration relationship enables the member states to have intergenerational borrowing (lending) and reach efficiency. As a result, if there is a cointegration within the member states, the efficiency incentive might strengthen their willingness of maintaining the ERM.
B. Tests for Stationarity and Cointegration
Consider the empirical problem which speculators face at a point in time.
They can use information on the time series behavior of reserves to deter mine whether there is an expected violation of intertemporal balance on the official settlements account. Therefore, to analyze the decision by specula tors whether or not to attack reserves at time ty only information up until time t can be used. We use a time series of Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) statistics to provide evidence on whether the behavior of the growth rate of reserves appears non-stationary at a point in time, given information up until that point in time. In order to maintain the constant power of the statis 9. A different approach to self-fulfilling attacks is to consider an expected future policy change, examples like Obstfeld [1986，1996] . Flood and Marion [1996] look at the self-fulfilling attack from the position of economic agents, who want to maximize their utility when facing an exchange rate risk. As a result, multi-equilibrium arises, and one of them brings a self-fulfilling attack. Under this circumstances, the attack is bounded by the position of fundamentals.
tics, we calculate the ADF statistics using a fixed sample size, which rolls through time. Banerjee, Lumsdaine and Stock [1992] proposed the use of 
III. Empirical Evidence

A. Data
This sample is monthly from January 1987 to September 1992.12 In each of the crises, the central parity either collapsed or was severely threatened.
The time series behavior of rolling ADF statistics on the growth rate of reserves is investigated for Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Holland, 300 Intertemporal Balance, Sustainability, and Efficiency of the Exchange Rate Mechanism 10. Evidence of an explicit trend break requires a sample following the break so that the new trend can be estimated. Banejee, Lumsdaine, and Stock [1992] proposed alter native statistics, which they labeled sequentially, for this purpose. 11. The way to make finite-sample corrections is to adjust the critical values by
CRr/CR^=T/{T-nk),
where CRT， T, n, and k represent the approximate finite-sample critical value, the asymptotic critical value provided by Johansen and Juselius [1990] , the effective number of observations, the number of variables in the estimated system, and the lag parameter. 12. Since the inception of the ERM in 1979， there were eleven realignments before Janu ary 1987. Thereafter, except in January 1990 when the Italian lira made a technical adjustment by replacing the wide band with the narrow band, there is no realign ment until the September 1992 crisis. After the crisis in August 1993, the fluctuation margin is widened to plus and minus 15% for the member states. Figure 1 . The period of exchange rate crisis is denoted by vertical lines.
B. Test Results and Discussion
For all countries, we present the results using a sample of five years, or 60
observations.14 The ADF statistics are estimated through the regression with a constant term and rolling through fixed lags for each currency and each ADF statistic. As noted, the lags chosen for implementing the unit root test are influential for generating the estimated statistics. We claim that the spec ulator for each member state follows a simple rule to estimate whether the intertemporal balance has been violated. The ADF test focuses on obliterat ing the serial correlation. The simple rules for choosing lags, therefore, are 13. Italian reserves abnormally increase during the period of the crisis. This is because on September 19， Italy withdrew from the ERM and let the lira float, and the reserves repatriated. The reserves increase at the end of the month. 14. Rolling through different sample sizes will obtain ADF statistics with the same pat tern, differing only in levels. A sample with a longer horizon could increase the power of the test. With a level of relatively lower ADF statistics, it rejects the null hypothesis more often. Owing to our short sample size, we chose a 5-year sample size for running the ADF test regression. Notes: 1. Dickey-Fuller statistics, including a constant, and variant lags (shown in the bracket behind the name of member states), which roll through ADF regression based on a five-year sample, are presented for each member state. The numbers that start in January 1991 are the statistics prior to a crisis, and Sep tember 1992 is the statistic for the crisis month. Critical values are -2.91 for a 5% significance level denoted by ** and -2.59 for a 10% significance level denoted by *.
and finally the reserve-accumulating states, Germany and Holland.15
In Belgium, starting from June the ADF statistics reject non-stationarity strongly by a 5% significance level. It arose when the National Bank of Bel gium raised interest rates in order to dampen the speculative attack caused by the Danish referendum. This policy change forced the ADF statistics down as indicated in Table 1 . In September 1992， the ADF statistic drops to -5.44, which rejects the non-stationary hypothesis for a 5% significance level. It is recorded that the prompt and large amount of reserves loss shows that there is foreign exchange market pressure from speculators.
This controversial result could come from the monthly data which con tributed to the data at the end of the period. This speculative movement will not be detected if it occurred in the beginning or in the middle of the period once the capital was repatriated after the crisis. The Belgian franc is fixed with the currency of Luxembourg which possesses a quite soundly-based economy; this might be another reason for its surviving the attack.
Though Denmark has been suffering from a trade deficit for years, its intertemporal balance is satisfied as indicated in Table l .16 Maastricht brings a rejection of the null hypothesis at a 5% confidence level.
The interest rate starts to decrease in September when the government realizes that the cost of maintaining a high interest rate outweighs the bene fits. Table 1 shows that the ADF statistic -2.97 weakly rejects the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. Owing to strong support from Germany, the Danish krone avoids speculative attack during the ERM crisis.17
304 Intertemporal Balance, Sustainability, and Efficiency of the Exchange Rate Mechanism 15. Cobham [1996] , Eichengreen and Wyplosz [1993] , and Goldstein and others [1993] present a detailed description about the ERM crisis of 1992. The book edited by Barrell [1992] includes papers which cover detailed economic backgrounds since the inception of the European Monetary System (EMS) for each member state. 16. Pakko and Pollard [1996] estimate that the Danish krone has been the most overval ued currency from the purchasing power parity (PPP) by the Big Mac index. This might explains the persistent trade deficit and the loss of foreign reserves by Den mark since 1991.
Meanwhile, France had been trying hard to contain itself within the crite ria of the Maastricht Treaty by sacrificing domestic stability. However, chron ic domestic imbalance increases the cost of maintaining the fixed regime.
Accidentally, the waves of the British and Italian crises transmit to France.
Owing to the resolve of the French government, and the joint statement in support of French franc/mark parity between Bundesbank and Banque de France, France does not abandon its parity. In Table 1 , all the ADF statistics reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. In September 1992, the ADF statistic is -4.55, which is a local minimum rejects the non-stationary hypoth esis at a 5% significance level; this implies that the French franc confronts a highly speculative currency pressure. Table 1 shows that the ADF statistics for Ireland, the last member of group 1, all reject the violation of intertemporal balance. In the month of the crisis, the ADF statistic is -2.62， which is a local maximum. This rejects nonstationarity only at a 10% significance level. By imposing capital control, Ire land prevents its punt from collapsing.
Of all the member states in the ERM, Italy has the largest inflation and interest rate differentials vis-a-vis Germany. There is no doubt that a crisis, if there is one, will probably originate in Italy.18 On September 13, 1992， the lira devalued by 7.0 percent against other currencies in the ERM. On Sep tember 19, the lira was withdrawn from the ERM. The ADF statistics in Table 1 show that Italy has violated the intertemporal balance since Decem ber 1991. In addition, since the Danish referendum, the ADF statistics are boosted and then increase as the time of the collapse approaches. At the time of collapse, the ADF statistic could not reject the null hypothesis though it starts to decrease.
Turn, now, to group 3, the surplus countries. Let us consider Germany first. Germany is an anchor country in the ERM. During a crisis, the Ger man mark is a safe haven. The inflow of capital brings an upper-bound cur 17. Being one of the pivotal states (France is another one) among those members stipu lated by Eichengreen and Wyplosz [1993] , Denmark has been supported by Ger many to stay in the ERM. 18. Italy has been pointed out as the member which has an obvious fundamental prob lem before the crisis, and the lira has been titled a sick currency. Related analysis can be found in Eichengreen and Wyplosz [1993] .
rency attack on Germany. In Table 1， all the ADF statistics exhibit rejection of the null hypothesis of non-stationarity prior to the months of the crisis. 
0.00
Notes: 1. The Johansen [1988] cointegration test is applied to a natural log of reserve levels for Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, and Ireland. The sample starts from Janu ary 1987 to August 1992， one month before the crisis, "r" represents the number of cointegrated vectors in the null hypothesis. CR. represents critical values in which a 5% significance level is denoted by **. The lag used for the test regression is four.
faces the pressure of capital inflow. Like Germany, the ADF statistics still reject the null hypothesis though the statistic jumps up to -4.72.
For testing efficiency, the results of Johansen's test are listed in Table 2 .
Note that the sample period starts in January 1987 and ends in August 1992.
We do not extend the sample into September 1992 because of the unstable results for most of the member states during September 1992 as Table 1 shows. Table 1 shows that the reserves of the member states are integrated by order 1 (denoted by 7(1)), except Italy. After applying the ADF unit root test to the level of the reserves (in the form of a logarithm), Holland is an 1(0). Accordingly, the cointegration test includes five members, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, and Ireland. The test statistics shown in Table   2 are estimated by using lag length 4. By using the adjusted critical value, the test fails to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration under 5% signif icant level.19
IV. Conclusion
In summary, Italy's case indicates that there is evidence of a violation of the intertemporal balance either prior to or at the time of the exchange rate crises. This is consistent with the hypothesis that speculators perceive evi dence of a failure of the intertemporal balance as evidence of future policy change, where a likely component of that change is the exchange rate. How ever, evidence of non-sustainability does not generate either immediate speculative attack or policy change. Under the assumption of intertemporal balance, evidence of non-sustainable policy implies future policy change.
The policy change might or might not include the exchange rate. Italy wait ed to change its exchange rate until the Fall of 1992.
Other members of the ERM in our study seem to be h it by a sudden attack since there are no signs of violation of the intertemporal balance prior to the crisis. This explains why much literature argues that the crisis of the ERM is triggered by the self-fulfilling model. Germany, an anchor country, similar to the United States in the Bretton Woods system, plays a 19. Most of the time, we choose the lag length by examining that there is no serial auto correlation. We have tried up to 8 lags, the results maintain with no cointegration by the adjusted critical values.
crucial role in the system. The violation of the intertemporal balance in Ger many signifies that the ERM is in jeopardy.
W ithout the support of efficient allocation of the foreign reserves within the member states, the ERM lose the grounds for fixing their parities. Fur thermore, without sound fundamentals and with limited adjustment allowed for the member states, the ERM is doomed to be fragile.
